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Talk by Prexy Nesbitt to Operation PUSH 
' February 9, 1991 
Greetings to the Reverend Barrow, Reverend Riddick and the entire PUSH family. 
We, the following Chicago based anti-apartheid and African solidarity organizations, 
wish to salute the February 8, 1991 historic decision of PUSH to uninvite Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi from speaking at the PUSH forum: 
TheCCISSA 
The Chicago Chapter of TransAfrica 
Clergy and Laity Concerned 
Synapses 
The Mozambique Support Network 
Illinois labor Network Against Apartheid 
The Free South Africa Movement 
and the All Chicago Anti-Apartheid Coalition. 
We urged PUSH to make this decision and were joined in so urging by various national 
organizations and figures such as the American Committee on Africa, the Washington 
Office on Africa, the Episcopal Church People for a Free South Africa, the Rev. William 
Howard, Randall Robinson, Congressman Charles Hayes and various representatives 
of Frontline States. 
We urged this decision be taken because while we recognize and encourage the recent 
efforts at rapprochement between the ANC and lnkatha and other organizations like the 
PAC; while we eagerly await the day when the violence will be ended so all energy will 
be focused in decisively ending apartheid and transforming South Africa; 
1.) The reality remains that the violence with which the Gatsha Buthelezi-
led lnkatha is associated has not in any way stopped; 
2.) lnkatha and its leader, South African government-salaried chief, 
Gatsha Buthelezi has been and remains an opponent of international 
sanctions and corporate disinvestment campaigns;' 
3.) Giving a platform to Gatsha Buthelezi would undermine Chicago's 
growing and increasingly unified anti-apartheid movement while 
unnecessarily legitimizing Gatha Buthelezi. 
The situation in South Africa today demands our rigorous attention and study. We must 
go beyond the 'black on black' violence labeling procession of a generally insensitive 
and uninformed U.S. press to see the conflict as being essentially between those 
associated with the apartheid sysem and it's structures and those opposing the 
'The American Committee on Africa recently pointed out that: "His links to the apartheid state are easier 
to document than his record of opposition. Last year direct South African subsidies to Buthelezi"s 
Kwazulu administration were $600 million -. about.three fourths of the total budget. Alone among the 
leaders of the non-independent bantustans, Pretoria allowed Buthe/ezi to create a separate tribal police 
force, the Kwazulu Police. in 1980, under the ccmmand of Jae Buchner. a 23-year veteran of the South 
African security police. Buchner told reporters his job had been to "disrupt the ANC in any way t cculd 
and spoil their attempts to bring South Africa down.• (ACOA's "Apartheid"s Hidden Hand." page 3.) 
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apartheid system. As with the killing of Black Panther Party leader Fred Hampton in 
Chicago in 1969, when black functionaries played such a decisive role, what has 
emerged in South Afrcia today is a situation where the governing apartheid regime has 
subcontracted the dirty business of killing apartheid's regimes to surrogate forces -
most of them black. 
According to the South African Institute of Race Relations' report of November 19, 1990, 
between September, 1984 and November, 1990 8,577 people died in political violence 
in South Africa. In 1990 an average of 1 O people were killed every day in South Africa -
a total of 3,038 in the first 1 o months. 
The primary source of the violence in South Africa today, as with the destabilization 
wars going on in the neighboring countries, is the South African government and its 
various security structures ranging from the army, police and constables to vigilantes 
and surrogate armed gangs. 
Various independent observers and hundreds of legal affidavits have come up with the 
following conclusions: 
• Almost all large-scale attacks have been initiated by organized groups 
of armed lnkatha warriors against individuals and communities who 
declined to join lnkatha. (e.g., of 200 violent incidents in Natal from 
January -April 1990, 195 were attributed to lnkatha.) 
• Prominent lnkatha members, as well as members of the KwaZulu 
police, which is recruited and directed by Buthelezi's administration, have 
been involved in the attacks. 
• With only a few exceptions, neither KwaZulu police nor the South 
African police have taken action against lnkatha gangs, nor have 
perpetrators been charged despite affidavits naming specific individuals 
and killings. 
' 
• Retaliatory actions by township 'comrades' have been largely 
spontaneous, not organized by leaders of the ANC, COSATU or UDF. 
Nevertheless, police action after clashes has included raids to disarm 
township residents and repeated detentions of anti-apartheid leaders. 
(Taken from Washington office on Africa "Natal/KwaZulu Buthelezi on the 
ANC: What's Behind the Violence, November, 1990.) 
and a recent report by African Watch indicates the following patterns by the South 
African security structures in the following basic stance assumed by the US 
government: 
The Role of the Security Forces in the Natal Conflct 
• The South African Police (SAP) and KwaZulu Police (ZP) have 
repeatedly joined with lnkatha in their attacks on UDF supporters. In these 
attacks, the SAP have transported lnkatha vigilantes.in police vehicles; 
shot and killed unarmed residents, burned and looted homes, and used 
teargas and bullets to prevent residents from defending themselves 
against lnkatha assailants; 
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• The SAP and kitskonstabels (or "instanr constables who are given a 
mere six weeks of training) have searched, harassed and threatened 
UDF-aligned residents and handed them over to members of lnkatha; 
• The SAP have refused requests for police intervention to disarm 
lnkatha groups and to prevent and halt lnkatha attacks; 
• The ZP have been particularly guilty of incidents of wild shooting and 
killing. Applicants for restraining orders against the ZP include officers of 
the SAP, who have been victims of indiscriminate attacks by the ZP; 
• The South African Defence Forces (SADF), although not as consistently 
implicated as the other forces, have harassed and physically abused 
UDF-aligned township residents and destroyed their property . 
The Role of the Security Forces In the Transvaal Township Violence. 
• The SAP have repeatedly transported and accompanied armed lnkatha 
members and vigilantes and stood idle during attacks; 
• The Sap have used teargas and bullets to disperse township residents 
attempting to defend themselves from lnkatha attacks; 
• The SAP have assaulted township residents and looted their homes 
when conducting weapons raids; 
• The SAP have refused request by township residents to disperse 
lnkatha attackers; 
• The South African government has refused to respond adequately to 
evidence of security force involvement in the violence. 
The US Role 
•The US government has consistently refrained from raising publicly the 
issues of security force involvement in the violence in Natal and the 
Transvaal townships; 
• In its public statements of the issue of "black on black" violence in South 
Africa, the ~'has underemphasized the governments' responsibility to 
protect the lives of it's citizens.' 
Further, we wish to bring to the attention of this meeting that recent information shows 
that professional killers previously linked to South Africa's surrogate armies in 
Mozambique (RENAMO) and Angola (UNITA) are now increasingly active in the killing 
• going on in South Africa. Also more and more automatic and heavy weaponry orig inally 
from South Africa previously used in Mozambique is now being re-introduced into the 
South African killing patterns. This trend is called the RENAMOIZATION of South Africa. 
In conclusion, friends ... 
Despite the recent talks between the honorable Nelson Mandela and Chief Gatsha 
Buthelezi, the violence has not stopped in South Africa. Further, that numerous 
2 Africa Wach, Jbe Killings in South Africa; Jbe Role of Jbe Secucttx Forces and the Response of the 
State, January 24, 1991. 
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independent and authoritative sources have identified the Gatsha Buthelezi-led lnkatha 
organization as the key source of the violence in South Africa that has already killed 
more than the strife in Beirut or in Northern Ireland. It must be recalled that as recently 
as April this year while chief Buthelezi was publicly declaring his 'peace aspirations' he 
privately told his chiefs: 
"As for now we should place ourselves on a war footing. We must now 
declare ourselves to be at war with those developments which wish to 
threaten us and the people who lead it. Going to war against that which 
threatens us is something which we as Zulu leaders understand and it is 
something which brings out the best in us.• (Emphasis added).• 
We would remind you that a renewed call for continued international sanctions came as 
recently as this past week from: 
• Nelson Mandela, deputy President of the ANC and 
• The Frontline States. 
While recognizing that the ANC is in dialogue with the lnkatha (as it is in dialogue with 
the government) this is not the time for anti-apartheid groups to initiate or emulate such 
dialogue - unless requested to do so by the national liberation movement. 
We Chicago-based organizations, while maintaining our organizational autonomy and 
integrity, have also always coordinated our decisions with the ANC and its political allies 
and have never attempted to pre-empt them. 
There is a lesson in this episode, i.e., the necessity for us all to be a unified and 
coordinated force in Chicago. We must be consistent and clear in out anti-apartheid and 
pro-Africa work. 
This was what we were attempting to consolidate. All the groups mentioned above 
joined 150 people in a major updating on Southern Africa at Malcom X in January of 
this year. We urge that PUSH join us more closely with this effort to be a unified and 
coordinated anti-apartheid force in Chicago. We urge further that PUSH and student 
organizations like the ACM close ranks with us to maintain the sanctions against South 
Africa. We urge the ACM colleges and other schools to continue their struggles for 
divestment. 
We thank you, PUSH, for being on the cutting edge - to this PUSH forum have come 
·members of FRELIMO, ZANU, SWAPO and the esteemed Oliver Tambo. 
We hope to some day welcome Nelson Mandela and others as leaders of the new 
South Africa. 
3 Weekly Mail, Johannesburg, April 12, 1990 
4 
